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a case for responsiBle development 
of tHe alBerta oil sands
In July 2009, in the remote community 
of Beaver Lake, Alberta, journalists from 
the BBC beheld an unusual sight: two 
British bankers taking part in a traditional 
Cree ceremony. From their business dress 
and stiff dancing, the bankers looked out 
of place, but it was not their familiarity or 
fascination with Cree culture that brought 
them there. They represented the UK-based 
Co-operative Bank, known for its aim to 
practice ethical investing, which had just 
agreed to financially assist the Cree with 
their legal challenge. The Beaver Lake Cree 
claim that after 130 years, rights they were 
guaranteed by treaty are being ignored by 
the governments of Alberta and Canada in 
order to allow for oil development.
Within the traditional hunting grounds 
of the Cree lies what some argue is the 
single largest oil deposit on the planet. By 
recoverable volume, the Alberta Oil Sands 
deposit is second only to the oil fields of 
Saudi Arabia. However, unlike the free-
flowing Saudi oil, the process of removing 
the tar-like bitumen from the sandy soil 
is energy intensive and, in some cases, 
extremely invasive. Mining companies 
remove the oil through on site steam injec-
tion or strip-mining, both of which carry 
significant environmental consequences. 
Currently, most of the oil sand is recov-
ered via strip-mining, where the oil must 
be washed from the sand with hot water, 
resulting in significant tailings effluent that 
is disposed of in massive tailings ponds. 
These ponds are often situated adjacent to 
natural bodies of water. Squeezing oil from 
sand has required drilling, mining, habitat 
removal, and creation of some twenty 
square miles of tailings ponds, dramati-
cally changing the habitat of the Beaver 
Lake Cree’s traditional hunting grounds 
and threatening the Cree’s way of life.
With help from the Co-operative Bank 
and others, the Beaver Lake Cree hope 
to stop the rapid expansion of the oil 
sands mining operations. Their complaint 
cites Treaty Six, signed in 1876 with the 
Canadian government, and pits rights guar-
anteed by a 130-year-old treaty against 
the economic potential of an estimated 
three million barrels of oil per day. In the 
treaty, the Beaver Lake Cree and many 
other native peoples in Alberta and Sas-
katchewan agreed to “cede, release, sur-
render and yield up to the Dominion of 
Canada . . . all their rights, titles and 
privileges” to their lands. In exchange, the 
Government agreed to protect their “right 
to pursue their avocations of hunting and 
fishing throughout the tract surrendered.” 
However, little scientific testing has been 
done to quantify the destruction that the 
Beaver Lake Cree observe around them 
and measure its impact on their “right to 
pursue their avocations.”
Fortunately for the Beaver Lake Cree, 
a recent case decided in British Columbia 
argued by their attorney Jack Woodward, 
suggests that courts still recognize and 
uphold such treaty rights. In Tsilhqot’in 
First Nation v. British Columbia, the court 
held that the Tsilhqot’in rights to hunt, 
trap, and trade on over 400,000 hectares 
of their territory had been violated. A 
similar success for the Beaver Lake Cree 
would help set a precedent in Canada that 
development of natural resources should 
not come at the expense of indigenous and 
human rights.
tHe failed execution of romell 
Broom: an “innocent misadventure” 
in due process?
For the third time in three years, Ohio’s 
execution team spent well over an hour 
trying to locate a suitable vein on an 
inmate through which to administer a lethal 
injection. Yet, Romell Broom’s attempted 
execution on September 15, 2009 is the 
first time Ohio has ever had to halt and 
reschedule an execution because the team 
could not establish an intravenous drip. The 
Governor’s warrant of reprieve postponing 
the execution said, “Difficulties in admin-
istering the execution protocol necessitate 
a temporary reprieve . . . .” The media 
drew attention to the pain Broom likely 
felt being poked 18 times with a needle, 
sometimes penetrating to the bone, and the 
frustration of his family, forced to watch 
the grueling and ultimately unsuccessful 
process. Some have even focused on the 
pattern of “difficulties” that has emerged 
in lethal injections in Ohio, contending that 
they constitute more than a mere “innocent 
misadventure,” as described by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Baze v. Rees, which held 
that Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol 
did not constitute cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, but noted that repeated abortive 
attempts at an execution might. The inepti-
tude revealed by Broom’s failed execution 
is magnified by the failure of due process 
to prevent such a situation. Only two weeks 
before his scheduled execution, the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Broom’s 
claims that just such a failure might occur.
After nearly 25 years on Ohio’s death 
row, Broom’s appeals and clemency efforts 
failed completely in 2007. He then inter-
vened in Cooey v. Strickland, challenging 
the constitutionality of lethal injection as 
administered in Ohio. The Sixth Circuit 
held on September 1, 2009 that there 
could be no recourse for Broom against 
Ohio’s execution protocol, even if it vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
of cruel and unusual punishment, because 
his claims violated the statute of limita-
tions. It was not relevant to the court that 
Broom was still involved in post-convic-
tion appeals at the time he should have 
begun litigation challenging the method of 
his execution to satisfy the statute. Requir-
ing death row inmates to pursue multiple 
paths of litigation simultaneously places a 
heavy burden on attorneys and their clients 
and challenges traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice. The injustice 
of these decisions is only heightened by the 
proximity of Broom’s failed execution to 
the extinguishment of his claims.
Had Broom’s claims succeeded under 
the statute of limitations, they still would 
have been held to the extremely high 
standard set forth in Baze, requiring that 
plaintiffs adequately prove an alternative 
execution method that is “feasible, read-
ily implemented, and in fact significantly 
reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain.” 
Such a high standard paired with limited 
means prevents death row inmates like 
Broom from effectively challenging the 
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execution method to be used on them, 
even in well-founded cases. Broom’s failed 
execution exemplifies not only the cruel 
and unusual nature of lethal injection, 
but also of the high barriers courts have 
erected against challenges to that method. 
The inability of inmates like Broom to 
overcome the heightened barriers created 
by cases like Baze and Cooey shows that 
what failed in Ohio was not just an execu-
tion protocol, but due process.
immigration detention centers: 
america’s otHer HealtHcare crisis
I am 35-year-old man without a 
penis with my life on the line. I have 
a young daughter, Vanessa, who is 
only 14. She is here with me today 
because she wanted to support me 
— and because I wanted her to 
see her father do something for the 
greater good, so that she will have 
that memory of me. The thought that 
her pain — and mine — could have 
been avoided almost makes this too 
much to bear.
Francisco Castaneda spoke these words 
on October 4, 2007 before the House Sub-
committee on Immigration, Citizenship, 
Refugees, Border Security, and Interna-
tional Law during a hearing titled “Deten-
tion and Removal: Immigration Detainee 
Medical Care.” Mr. Castaneda died five 
months later from metastasized squamous 
cell carcinoma of the penis. His fam-
ily maintains the civil case he brought 
against the Government for its failure to 
provide adequate medical care while he 
was detained at an immigration deten-
tion center in California. The case is now 
before the U.S. Supreme Court, stalled 
on the issue of whether Mr. Castaneda’s 
family has standing to sue the individuals 
responsible for deciding that the medical 
procedures that could have saved his life 
were “elective” and therefore not available 
to detainees.
With over 300,000 people moving 
through the U.S. immigrant detention sys-
tem each year, problems of access to ade-
quate medical care affect large numbers of 
people. The federal government provides 
medical care at 23 immigration detention 
facilities, which house nearly half of the 
33,000 immigrants detained on any given 
day. The average duration of detention is 
38 days, but some immigrants wait months 
or even years for their day in court. Dur-
ing that time, detainees are only allowed 
medical care approved by Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE), the agency in 
charge of the detention centers. ICE’s cur-
rent policy is to hold detainees who are fit 
for deportation, allowing non-emergency 
off-site doctors visits only if necessary 
to prevent a change in deportation status. 
Fortunately, that policy is set to change in 
2010 to provide detainees more access to 
non-emergency medical attention.
These changes came too late for Mr. 
Castaneda. There is also concern that they 
will not help many detainees who need it 
most. The regulations set forth by ICE’s 
parent agency, the Department of Home-
land Security, are not binding on ICE or 
its employees. They have the legal weight 
of suggestion, and since only one in ten 
detainees has a lawyer, it is likely that 
few would be equipped to pursue a legal 
remedy.
Federal employees are considered by the 
majority of U.S. federal circuits to be pro-
tected from suit by the Federal Tort Claims 
Act. If successful, Mr. Castaneda’s civil 
suit has the potential to provide a remedy 
to those who have access to counsel by 
allowing claims against ICE employees in 
their individual capacity. Mr. Castaneda’s 
Bivens claim, an action outside the scope 
of the Federal Tort Claim Act, against the 
doctors who treated him and the officials 
who denied him care may scare the agency 
or Congress into action, providing some 
avenue of relief for detainees seeking jus-
tice. Still, a more reasonable solution is to 
create a binding set of rules to ensure that 
immigrants detained in the United States 
are not denied basic medical care.
latin ameriCa
guatemalan court sentences 
military official for 1980s forced 
disappearances
For the first time in Guatemalan history, 
a former military official was found guilty 
of ordering the forced disappearances of 
indigenous civilian farmers during the vio-
lent 36-year civil war. On August 31, 2009, 
a panel of three judges sentenced Felipe 
Cusanero Coj to 150 years in prison: 25 
years for each of the six disappeared farm-
ers. In Guatemala, cases for forced disap-
pearances can be brought anytime until 
the remains of the missing are found. The 
bodies of the six farmers, each abducted 
between 1982 and 1984, have not been 
recovered and their families initiated pro-
ceedings against Cusanero in 2003.
The Guatemalan conflict between left-
ist guerrillas and government forces raged 
from 1960 to 1996, ending when the two 
sides signed the 1996 Peace Accords. Dur-
ing this time about 250,000 people, primar-
ily indigenous Mayans, were killed and 
about 45,000 were forcibly disappeared. 
Forced disappearance, a powerful tool used 
by the government during the conflict, is 
defined as the detention or abduction of 
a person by a government or group acting 
with the government’s authority, coupled 
with the concealment of the fate of the 
person. As with many of the disappeared, 
it is unclear why these six farmers were 
targeted or what happened to them.
During the conflict, the government 
created “civil defense patrols,” made up 
of groups of citizens who were forced 
or recruited to patrol their communities. 
There is some disagreement as to whether 
Cusanero is considered a former para-
military official or military official. Since 
the Guatemalan government is trying to 
avoid responsibility for the actions of the 
civil defense patrols during the conflict, 
it considers the individuals who were part 
of these patrols to be paramilitary. During 
the conflict, government forces detained, 
killed, and disappeared people, frequently 
ordering these patrols to do the same. 
Cusanero, who was the mayor of his com-
munity at the time, was in charge of the 
patrol located west of Guatemala City and 
ordered the forced disappearances of com-
munity members. Since he was in charge 
of military operations in the area, he most 
likely ordered the forced disappearances of 
additional civilians, but other community 
members have remained silent for fear of 
retaliation.
Such fear has several likely roots. Indig-
enous communities are still wary of the 
Guatemalan government because of past 
government-led oppression. In addition, 
some former military leaders still work 
for the government and wield significant 
power. Furthermore, since the civil defense 
patrols pitted community members against 
one another, people who were part of these 
patrols and those who were targeted often 
still live in close proximity. Survivors of 
the conflict are often hesitant to institute 
proceedings because they would have to 
continue living in the same community as 
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the individuals they would be accusing of 
committing heinous crimes.
Although the Cusanero decision sets a 
significant precedent in accountability for 
forced disappearances, Cusanero played a 
very small part in the larger scheme of the 
civil war. The masterminds of the conflict 
have yet to be held responsible for their 
actions.
Nevertheless, the Cusanero case is 
a welcome exception to past trends in 
the Guatemalan justice system regarding 
human rights violations committed during 
the conflict. Cases of this nature have often 
floundered, as both the parties bringing the 
action and the judges frequently receive 
threats, usually from the accused. Hope-
fully this change in direction will mark 
a new beginning of accountability in the 
Guatemalan justice system, while provid-
ing closure for families of the victims of 
the disappeared.
indigenous ecuadorians clasH witH 
police over proposed water law
Hundreds of indigenous peoples from 
the Ecuadorian Amazon protested the pro-
posal of a new national water law on 
September 30, 2009. The protest was orga-
nized by the Confederation of Indigenous 
Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), a 
group working to protect natural resources. 
Held near the southern city of Macas, 
the protest ended in violence as police 
killed one indigenous man and injured 
dozens more. Approximately forty police 
officers were also injured. The violence 
was halted when police pulled out of the 
region on orders from Ecuador’s president, 
Rafael Correa. Following the conflict, Cor-
rea invited indigenous leaders to the capital 
to discuss their concerns regarding the 
proposed law. Although CONAIE has yet 
to meet its primary objective of complete 
authority over indigenous communities’ 
ancestral lands and resources, it appears to 
be making progress through dialogue with 
government officials.
The indigenous communities are sur-
rounded by wetlands, which provide the 
water they need for subsistence farming 
and drinking. However, new commercial 
mining projects are being developed in this 
fragile environment. The new water law 
would prioritize private mining companies’ 
use of water for their operations, effec-
tively privatizing water resources. Mines 
typically use large amounts of water in 
order to extract metals from the rock. 
Indigenous communities are concerned 
that if the state grants these private com-
panies unlimited access, there will not 
be enough water to adequately fulfill the 
needs of the communities.
This proposed law may be in direct 
conflict with Ecuador’s newly passed 
constitution, which articulates the rights 
of indigenous communities to maintain 
possession of their communal lands and 
ancestral territories, including participa-
tion in the use of natural resources. The 
Constitution explicitly provides the rights 
to water and nourishment, as well as the 
right of the pacha mama (mother earth) to 
be respected, maintained, and regenerated. 
Roughly translated, Article 15 stipulates 
that the sovereignty of energy will not take 
priority over the right to water. Therefore, 
the use of water by private companies 
should not take precedence over the water 
needs of local communities.
While the President has agreed to coop-
erate with indigenous communities, he 
must balance these concerns with national 
interests, such as generation of income 
from mining operations. The Congress has 
suspended further discussions on the law 
until further notice.
This kind of conflict is not unique 
to Ecuador and seems to be a recurring 
problem throughout Latin America. For 
example, in June 2009, Peruvian police 
killed dozens of Amazonian indigenous 
peoples who were protesting new govern-
ment policies allowing foreign companies 
to exploit natural resources in the commu-
nities’ ancestral lands.
The noticeable similarity between these 
conflicts is that the interests of indigenous 
communities do not appear to be a govern-
ment priority. These communities rely on 
natural resources and communal living 
to survive, and their homelands are being 
destroyed by natural resource extraction 
projects with increasing frequency. Given 
this reality, it is essential for indigenous 
groups to continue to organize against 
encroachment on their land, culture, and 
way of life.
controversy over nicaraguan 
supreme court ruling allowing 
president ortega to seek 
re-election in 2011
On October 19, 2009, left-wing Sand-
inista justices on the Constitutional Com-
mission of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court 
ruled that Sandinista President Daniel 
Ortega will be eligible to run for re-election 
in 2011. The decision effectively overturns 
portions of Article 147 of the Nicaraguan 
Constitution, which set a presidential term 
limit of no more than two inconsecutive 
terms. The decision is said to be final, but 
the right-wing Liberal party justices argue 
that it is illegal.
This decision presents two issues. First, 
because Latin America is plagued with a 
history of dictatorships, preserving presi-
dential term limits in this region is of 
the utmost importance. The international 
community has expressed concern over 
the number of Latin American presidents 
who have been attempting to amend presi-
dential term limits. For example, President 
Hugo Chávez of Venezuela won a popular 
referendum in February of this year that 
eliminates term limits.
Nicaragua’s Constitution has included 
presidential term limits since 1995. The 
National Assembly can amend constitu-
tional provisions by a two-thirds majority 
vote. The Supreme Court cannot amend the 
Constitution, but can rule part of it “inap-
plicable,” as it did in its most recent deci-
sion on term limits. After an unsuccessful 
attempt to get the National Assembly to lift 
the limits, President Ortega filed a “motion 
of unconstitutionality,” which was referred 
to the Supreme Court for a ruling.
The second issue raised by this decision 
is the Supreme Court’s lack of transpar-
ency while reaching the decision. During 
the ruling, only Sandinista justices were 
present even though Liberal party justices 
also sit on the Constitutional Committee. 
Liberal party justices claim they were not 
called in time to participate in the decision 
and that they did not know the decision 
was even being made at that time. The 
Supreme Court as a whole has yet to vote 
on the issue. The U.S. State Department 
commented that “the ruling appears to 
short circuit, through legal maneuverings, 
the open and transparent consideration by 
the Nicaraguan people of the possibility for 
presidential re-election.” 
Nations across Latin America struggle 
with upholding constitutional limits on 
presidential terms. Proponents of the soft-
ening of presidential term limits argue that 
allowing for two or more consecutive terms 
may provide more time for presidents 
to accomplish their goals and capitalize 
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on campaign promises. Furthermore, if 
presidents are vying for re-election, they 
may have additional incentive to appease 
their citizens to gain voter support. While 
these arguments are well founded, Latin 
America has a special interest in closely 
monitoring this trend to ensure that his-
tory is not repeated. If the softening of 
presidential term limits is indeed found to 
be beneficial, the process of doing so must 
be transparent if the countries concerned 
wish to maintain democracies. In the case 
of Nicaragua, Ortega should ensure that 
the process is consistent with democratic 
principles.
sub-saharan aFriCa
côte d’ivoire: settlement But no 
liaBility in toxic waste dumping 
case
In August 2006, hundreds of thousands 
of people in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, dis-
covered that noxious toxic waste had been 
dumped in 15 public locations around the 
city, forcing thousands to flee their homes 
and businesses. Following the dumping, 
as many as 17 deaths were linked to toxic 
waste exposure, and over 100,000 people 
visited health clinics. The public outcry 
against the incident was so overwhelming 
that Côte d’Ivoire’s interim government 
was forced to resign.
Trafigura, a Dutch-based crude oil com-
pany, acknowledges hiring a contractor to 
dump the waste in Côte d’Ivoire, but denies 
any wrongdoing. Evidence suggests, how-
ever, that the company was aware of the 
environmental and public health dangers 
and the likelihood of inadequate waste 
disposal in Côte d’Ivoire. After failing 
to legally unload the waste elsewhere, 
Trafigura transported it to Abidjan on 
August 19, 2006 and hired a local contrac-
tor. The contractor, Tommy Ltd., had been 
established only weeks before and had no 
prior experience handling caustic waste. 
Although Tommy Ltd. assured Trafigura 
that it would dump the waste in proper 
facilities in Akouédo, an area outside of 
Abidjan, minimal research would have 
revealed that the town had no caustic waste 
facilities. Trafigura paid Tommy Ltd. U.S. 
$20,000 for its services — services which, 
if done properly elsewhere, would have 
cost 16 times that price.
For the past three years, various legal 
battles have ensued to determine liability 
and to punish those responsible. Three 
company officers, including Trafigura boss 
Claude Dauphin, spent six months in an 
Abidjan jail following the incident. They 
were released shortly after an out-of-court 
settlement with the Ivoirian government. 
In 2008, Salomon Ugborugbo, the owner 
of Tommy Ltd., was convicted for poi-
soning and sentenced to twenty years in 
prison. Seven other Ivoirian officials were 
acquitted, and the State decided evidence 
was insufficient for criminal proceedings 
against Trafigura officials.
In February 2007, without consult-
ing victims’ associations, Côte d’Ivoire’s 
government accepted a U.S. $198 mil-
lion settlement from Trafigura for cleanup 
and victim compensation, and waived any 
future State liability actions. However, 
many human rights groups assert that vic-
tims have had difficulty registering claims 
or receiving compensation proportionate to 
their medical and other related expenses.
On September 17, 2009, the victims’ 
lawyers from the British firm Leigh Day & 
Co. also settled with Trafigura. The agree-
ment allowed 31,000 victims to collect 
U.S. $1,546 each, approximately six times 
less than originally sought. The settlement 
stated that the victims accepted that the 
waste was not clearly linked to any deaths 
or serious injuries, and that Trafigura was 
not responsible for Tommy Ltd.’s illegal 
dumping.
In October 2009, a confidential scien-
tific report conducted by Trafigura was 
leaked to the public. It links thousands of 
illnesses to the dumping and acknowledges 
that, one month after the dumping, Trafig-
ura was aware that the lethal substances 
could cause deaths, severe burns, and other 
side effects. Trafigura failed to release the 
report or any of this information to the 
31,000 victims involved in the settlement.
While no further legal action can be 
brought against Trafigura in Côte d’Ivoire, 
a 20,000 person class-action suit is pend-
ing in the United Kingdom. Meanwhile, 
the Dutch government has chosen not to 
pursue any legal action against Claude 
Dauphin.
Although cleanup efforts in Abidjan 
began in September 2006, some sites 
remain contaminated. The United Nations 
reports that a French company has success-
fully decontaminated eight dump sites, but 
others remain unsafe. Prior to and since the 
Côte d’Ivoire incident, Trafigura has been 
linked with numerous questionable busi-
ness dealings.
international community must 
respond forcefully to guinea 
massacre
The September 28, 2009, daylight mas-
sacre of 150 peaceful demonstrators by 
Guinean security forces sparked interna-
tional outrage and condemnation. Unfortu-
nately, violence by Guinean security forces 
is not unprecedented. In 2007, security 
forces suppressed public demonstrations 
by killing over 130 people and injur-
ing more than 1,500 people. In response, 
the then transition government of former 
military president Lansana Conté created 
an Independent National Commission 
of Inquiry that documented up to 3,156 
human rights violations. However, no one 
was arrested and victims have not received 
promised compensation.
Despite pressure on former president 
Conté after the 2007 killings, Guinea 
never returned to civilian rule. Hours after 
Conté’s death in December 2008, Moussa 
Dadis Camara led a military coup and sus-
pended the Constitution. In response, the 
African Union suspended Guinea’s mem-
bership, but Nigeria, Senegal, and France 
supported Camara. In an attempt to ensure 
a timely and transparent transition to civil-
ian government, regional groups formed 
the International Contact Group on Guinea 
in February 2009.
Weeks before the most recent massacre, 
however, Camara indicated that he would 
run in the January 2010 election. Civil-
ians mounted a protest in Conakry, which 
ended when Guinea security forces opened 
fire and killed an estimated 150 people, 
injured 1,253, and publically raped at least 
33 women.
To prevent future atrocities, the inter-
national community must respond more 
forcefully than it has in the past. So far, 
the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) has appointed Burkina 
Faso’s president, Blaise Compaoré, to 
mediate between Camara’s party and the 
political opposition. On October 14, 2009, 
the International Criminal Court’s prosecu-
tor confirmed that he is investigating pos-
sible war crimes committed by Guinea’s 
security forces. On October 30, 2009, 
the United Nations announced that three 
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prominent jurists will form an independent 
commission to inquire into the events.
While these actions are encouraging, 
the situation in Guinea remains unstable. 
On October 28, 2009, approximately thirty 
youths led a five-day hunger strike to pro-
test further violence and encourage politi-
cal dialogue. Domestic and international 
investigations must produce results and 
lead to prosecutions of the responsible par-
ties. Above all, Guinea must be pressured 
to return to a civilian government and 
restore the rule of law.
ZamBia to decide constitutionality 
of mandatory Hiv testing
For the first time, a Zambian court is 
considering whether it is constitutional to 
exclude HIV-positive personnel from the 
military. Sergeants Stainley Kingaipe and 
Charles Chookole allege that the Zambian 
Air Force (ZAF) subjected them to HIV 
testing without consent or counseling, in 
violation of their rights to privacy, free-
dom from cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment, and freedom from discrimina-
tion, pursuant to Articles 11, 15, and 23 
of the Zambian Constitution. Both are 
represented by the Legal Resources Foun-
dation of Zambia, with assistance from the 
Southern Africa Litigation Centre and the 
Zambian AIDS Law Research and Advo-
cacy Network.
Kingaipe and Chookole served in the 
ZAF for 13 years. In 2001, both went for 
medical exams and, unlike in prior rou-
tine exams, they were given blood tests 
and subsequently placed on anti-retrovi-
ral medication. They never received test 
results and were not told the purpose of the 
medication. A year later, the ZAF Medical 
Board assessed both men unfit for service 
and discharged them, even though neither 
had taken any sick leave and Cookole had 
in fact been promoted. The two men did 
not find out they were HIV-positive until 
both later went for voluntary HIV testing, 
and were informed that they had already 
been given anti-retrovirals.
Since 2003, the ZAF’s official policy 
bans HIV-positive recruits, but does not 
allow the military to discharge HIV-posi-
tive people who are already employed. The 
ZAF claims that the men were dismissed 
because Kingaipe has cancer and Choo-
kole has tuberculosis; however this does 
not explain why neither was informed they 
were HIV-positive.
The current litigation reflects a larger 
debate among governments, NGOs, and 
human rights groups over how to imple-
ment policies designed to curb the spread 
of HIV while protecting the rights of 
infected people. In 2008, the Pretoria High 
Court in South Africa declared that mili-
tary bans on HIV-positive recruits and 
employees were unconstitutional, despite 
the military’s claim that they posed a risk to 
other soldiers, were not suited for stressful 
conditions, and undermined the military’s 
duty to protect the nation. On the other 
hand, in Botswana, employers in all profes-
sions can legally test and deny employment 
to HIV-positive applicants. The United 
Nations allows HIV-positive people in its 
peace-keeping forces, but permits contin-
ued service so long as they pass regular 
“fitness for duty” health assessments.
Zambian Health Minister Kapembwa 
Simbao has called for compulsory HIV 
testing for everyone who visits a public 
health facility, because voluntary counsel-
ing and testing procedures have not led to 
widespread testing. Zambia has a 14 per-
cent HIV infection rate — a number which 
rises to 29 percent in the military — and 
only 15 percent of the population has ever 
been voluntarily tested.
Human rights groups assert that manda-
tory testing violates the right to privacy 
and leads to discrimination. Compulsory 
HIV testing may also cause people to avoid 
going to health care centers and increase 
stigma and discrimination. Policies that 
limit freedom instead of protecting rights 
lead to laws that are blatantly discrimina-
tory. For example, in Togo it is illegal not to 
use a condom, and in Guinea, Guinea-Bis-
sau, Mali, and Niger, women can be crimi-
nally charged for not taking precautions to 
prevent transmitting HIV to their unborn 
children. Currently, 15 HIV-positive Nam-
bian women are suing the government for 
forced sterilizations at public hospitals.
As nations struggle to prevent the spread 
of HIV, they must also respect human rights 
and refrain from discriminatory practices. 
Zambia is bound by its Constitution, the 
African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights, and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, all of which 
require the government to protect individu-
als from inhuman and degrading treatment, 
privacy, and discrimination. To adhere to 
these obligations, the Zambian High Court 
should order the ZAF to reinstate Kingaipe 
and Chookole and give HIV-positive mem-
bers regular health assessments instead of 
barring them from service.
middle east and north aFriCa
situation worsens for yemeni 
refugees
An estimated 150,000 civilians have 
been displaced and left with little humani-
tarian aid in Northern Yemen as a result 
of recent conflict. Fighting between the 
Yemeni government and the Huthis, a 
Shia rebel group based in the northern 
province of Sa’ada, began in 2004 when 
cleric leader Hussein al-Houthi launched 
an uprising against the Government. The 
Yemeni government recommenced military 
action in July 2009 after a year-long cease-
fire, and violence has escalated in recent 
months. Aid organizations are declaring 
conditions for civilians in Northern Yemen 
a humanitarian crisis.
Thousands of civilians have fled their 
homes to escape the fighting. However, 
many have become stranded with no access 
to food, medical attention, electricity, shel-
ter, clean water, or protection. The area 
has been inaccessible to outsiders for three 
months, and food reserves are running 
out.  
The Yemeni army has blocked aid to 
Sa’ada city, claiming that the current situ-
ation is too dangerous for aid workers to 
enter. The International Red Cross and 
Red Crescent have been able to assist indi-
viduals who managed to escape the conflict 
area, but those stuck in the city have been 
left with no humanitarian aid.
Aid organizations are hoping that the 
Huthis rebel group and the Yemeni govern-
ment will declare a temporary cease-fire 
so that humanitarian groups can enter the 
area, but this seems unlikely. A ceasefire 
was briefly declared for Eid al-Fitr, but 
both sides accused each other of violating 
it.
Even those who are able to reach refu-
gee camps are not necessarily safe. On 
September 17, 2009, Yemeni air strikes hit 
a refugee camp near the Sufian area, kill-
ing 87 civilians and injuring 40 others. The 
UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reports 
that many of the casualties are women and 
children.
Like all non-state armed groups, the 
same humanitarian law principles to which 
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Yemen is bound also bind the Huthi rebel 
group. Both have an obligation under Arti-
cle 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention on 
the Protection of Civilian Persons to allow 
the civilian populations at risk access to 
humanitarian aid. Further, Article 54 of 
Additional Protocol I prohibits states and 
non-state actors from leaving civilian pop-
ulations with inadequate access to food and 
water. As hundreds of civilians wait, dis-
placed from their homes and exposed to the 
violence of war, it is clear that neither side 
is upholding its international obligations.
In its flash appeal on September 2, 2009 
to stimulate funding for relief efforts in 
Yemen, the UN Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) warned 
that the crisis could worsen in the follow-
ing weeks and called on the international 
community to step up relief effort. As of 
November 10, OCHA had only collected 
about 46 percent of the U.S. $23.7 million 
for which it appealed.
as tHe syrian supreme state 
security court resumes operation, 
arrests and sentencing of Human 
rigHts defenders increase 
On September 17, 2009, the European 
Parliament passed a resolution demand-
ing the release of Muhammad al-Hassni. 
Hassni, the president of the Syrian Orga-
nization for Human Rights, is known for 
monitoring the detention conditions and 
legal practices of the Syrian Supreme State 
Security Court (SSSC). The Syrian govern-
ment arrested him on July 28, charging him 
with “weakening national sentiment.” 
Hassni’s arrest is part of a wave of 
repression against human rights defenders 
that began early this summer. As recently 
as September, the Syrian Centre for Media 
and Free Expression was closed without 
warning, and blogger Kareem Arabji was 
sentenced to three years in prison. This 
trend seems particularly timely. After an 
eight-month hiatus, the controversial SSSC 
quietly restarted its operations, just two 
months prior to Hassni’s arrest.
Human Rights Watch issued a report 
last year calling on Syria to dissolve the 
SSSC. The report accused the SSSC of 
using illegal incarcerations to intimidate 
political opposition. The SSSC practices 
violate a number of international conven-
tions that Syria has ratified. Article 14 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights entitles a suspect to “ade-
quate time and facilities for the preparation 
of his defense,” and Article 19 guarantees 
the right of freedom of expression. The 
SSSC’s punishment of political prisoners 
for their opinions without an opportunity 
to defend themselves is a violation of this 
Convention. The SSSC is also in violation 
of Article 1 of the International Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
which prohibits using physical or men-
tal pain to obtain a confession. Coercing 
confessions is a common practice in the 
pretrial period of the SSSC.
The SSSC was introduced in 1963 as an 
exceptional court to prosecute critics of the 
Government. Its charges against defendants 
criminalize freedom of expression. Among 
them are: “exposing Syria to the threat of 
hostile acts;” “weakening nationalist senti-
ments;” and “opposing the objectives of 
the revolution.” Defendants are subjected 
to extensive pretrial detentions and tor-
ture, allowed minimal contact with law-
yers, denied the right to appeal, and often 
given pre-determined judgments. Torture 
and restricting legal aid are violations of 
Article 31 of The UN Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.
The prison associated with the SSSC, 
which houses bloggers, journalists, 
Islamists, and activists, is notorious for 
its poor conditions and use of torture. On 
July 5, 2008, Syrian police opened fire on 
rioting inmates, killing approximately 25 
prisoners. There is no evidence as to what 
happened to the prisoners in Sednaya that 
day. The riot prompted the SSSC to halt its 
operations temporarily.
Despite widespread international pro-
tests, the SSSC resumed its functions this 
summer. Since then, arbitrary arrests of 
political activists and journalists in Syria 
have escalated. The rise in the number of 
prosecutions against human rights defend-
ers in Syria seems to indicate a larger effort 
to repress Syrian civil society.
egyptian civil society organiZations 
protest egypt’s legal persecution 
of activists, artists, and academics 
Egyptian activists, academics, lawyers, 
and non-governmental organizations came 
together on October 10, 2009 to denounce 
a number of Hesba cases brought against 
activists, artists, and academics in Egypt. 
Hesba cases are lawsuits that can only be 
filed by Muslims against individuals or 
organizations accusing them of insulting 
God. The Arab Network for Human Rights 
released a report earlier this month criticiz-
ing the quantity of Hesba cases that were 
being brought in Egyptian courts. Support-
ers of the campaign against Hesba assert, 
“An opinion should never drag anyone to 
court.”
The arrest of Hassan Hanafi and Sayed 
El Qemany were the final impetus for the 
campaign. Hanafi and El Qemany are 
Egyptian academics whose research on 
reinterpretations of Islamic history and 
critiques of political Islam incited protests 
among conservative Islamists. Both were 
accused of apostasy and are to be brought 
in front of Egyptian courts in Hesba cases.
While Hesba cases are not unique to 
Egypt, they are most prevalent there. This 
fall, Egyptian courts have accepted more 
Hesba cases than ever before. Although the 
Prosecutor General has the right to limit 
the number of Hesba cases that make it to 
court, individuals continue to file hundreds 
of complaints. The Prosecutor General has 
legitimized these complaints by allowing 
many of them to proceed to full-fledged 
hearings.
Those who file Hesba cases often use 
them to persecute individuals working in 
academia, science, politics, art, and cin-
ema. By permitting Hesba cases to come 
into court, Egypt gives these complaints 
a legal basis. Numerous writers, intel-
lectuals, filmmakers, and activists have 
been prosecuted in court. Among them are 
famed Egyptian feminist, Nawal El Saa-
dawi, who exiled herself to America after 
repeated threats on her life, and Naguib 
Sawiris, a businessman who criticized the 
Egyptian Constitution for allowing Islamic 
law to be a “major legislation resource.” 
Punishments for those prosecuted in 
Hesba courts go beyond fines and impris-
onment, and include manipulating mar-
riages, revoking citizenships, and physical 
violence. Egyptian professor Nasr Hamid 
Abu Zaid was forcibly divorced from his 
wife for his controversial perspectives on 
the Quran. The couple fled to the Nether-
lands after the ruling. In February 2009, 
courts revoked the citizenships of Egyp-
tians who were married to Israelis because 
their marriages were claimed to be a threat 
to national security and Islam. An Egyp-
tian filmmaker, Enad El-Dighaidy, and an 
unveiled Egyptian actress were threatened 
with eighty lashes for “defaming the coun-
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try,” but the trial court decided in favor of 
El-Dighaidy and the actress.
The Hesba cases violate Articles 15, 
16, and 19 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. These articles reaf-
firm the right to protection from arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality, state protection 
of family and marriage, and freedom of 
expression and opinion. Further, the Hesba 
cases are in violation of the Cairo Declara-
tion on Human Rights in Islam adopted 
by Member States of the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference. Specifically, these 
cases violate Article 5, the right to mar-
riage, and Article 16, the right to enjoy 
the fruits of scientific, literary, artistic, or 
technical production. While these rights 
can be subverted by violations of Shar’ia 
Islamic law, Shar’ia stipulates that state 
courts do not have the religious authority to 
judge what are and what are not violations 
of Islamic law.
A campaign initiated by the Arab Net-
work for Human Rights and the Hisham 
Mubarak Law Center is currently seeking 
supporters to denounce efforts to limit 
the freedom of expression and research 
in Egypt. Through the campaign, these 
organizations hope to deter the use of 
legal mechanisms to persecute Egyptian 
intellectuals and scholars. So far, six other 
Arab human rights organizations and two 
lawyers have joined the campaign. The 
Egyptian government has yet to respond to 
these organizations’ protests.
euroPe
lead-contaminated roma camps in 
kosovo
The Roma community’s decade-long 
exposure to lead contamination in northern 
Kosovo is one example of European reluc-
tance to expose and rectify the persistent 
human rights issues that Roma face.
During the 1999 bombing of Kosovo, 
the Roma lived in Serb-majority areas in 
the Mitrovica region of northern Kosovo. 
Due to their linguistic ties, the Roma 
were perceived as Serbian corroborators 
and were targets of retaliatory Albanian 
violence and eventually expulsion from 
the region. One of these raids destroyed 
the Roma Mahalla (“neighborhood” in 
Turkish) in Mitrovica. As a result, a total 
of 8,000 people were internally displaced.
While many fled to neighboring coun-
tries, others were temporarily relocated by 
the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) to camps in the 
Mitrovica region, where they live in make-
shift tents, huts, and metal containers. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) 
advised the UNHCR against building these 
camps because toxic lead waste in the area 
made the land unsafe for human habitation. 
The UNHCR did not heed these warnings, 
and Roma families have lived in these 
camps ever since.
Limited access to clean water and inad-
equate diet have compounded the problem 
of lead contamination levels for the Roma 
living in the camps. According to medical 
studies conducted by Human Rights Watch, 
lead exposure can damage internal organs 
and the nervous system, stunt growth, and 
lead to behavioral problems. It can also 
negatively affect fetal brain development, 
causing disabilities and mental retardation. 
WHO-sponsored medical treatment for 
poisoned Roma children was discontinued 
in 2007 because, without relocation and 
adequate diet, treatment would be futile.
Three main solutions were proposed 
for the displaced Roma. The first was to 
rebuild the Mahalla resettlement. Although 
many international actors preferred this 
option, it was rejected by the residents of 
the camps because they would lose access 
to Serbian welfare and health benefits. 
Second and most popular among the camp 
residents was resettlement north of the Ibar 
River. There is, however, no land presently 
available for such an undertaking. The third 
is to relocate residents to other countries. 
This idea seems unrealistic mainly because 
Western European countries are reluctant 
to take in Eastern European Roma. As 
one European Commission official stated, 
“There is no appetite in Europe for more 
asylum seekers from that region.”
The Roma’s ongoing plight in Kosovo 
results from the lack of one single institu-
tion to assume responsibility for negotiat-
ing and implementing urgent evacuation 
and medical treatment for these individu-
als. The UNHCR initially managed the 
camps, followed by United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK), and then the Kosovo Agency for 
Advocacy and Development since Janu-
ary 2009. Camp residents view this latest 
change in management as a sign that the 
international community is washing its 
hands of this burden.
Roma rights activists like Diane Post 
continue their efforts to obtain justice. In 
July 2008, Post helped an international 
law firm file a complaint on behalf of the 
Roma families with the UNMIK Human 
Rights Advisory Panel for violations of the 
right to life, protection against inhumane 
and degrading treatment, and the right to 
a fair trial. The case is currently pending.
The treatment of the displaced Roma is 
an institutionalized crime. Ongoing lead 
poisoning in Kosovo is especially appalling 
because aid organizations are complicit. 
Former Czech President and human rights 
campaigner, Vaclav Havel, once said, “The 
fate of the Roma would be a litmus test for 
Europe’s new democracies.” Based on this 
account of the Roma in Kosovo, it seems 
that Europe has yet to meet Havel’s test.
italy’s immigration policy faces new 
criticism
Italy’s new public security law, passed 
on August 8, 2009, is the latest in a series of 
measures by the government to combat the 
rise in illegal immigration. The law seeks 
to deter illegal immigration by making it 
a criminal offense punishable by fines of 
€5,000 to €10,000, with prison terms of 
up to four years for those who defy expul-
sion orders. The law also allows unarmed 
civilians to work alongside enforcement 
officers to report and apprehend undocu-
mented individuals. Italian citizens who 
help hide migrants or fail to report them 
could face anti-solidarity charges. Ear-
lier this year, the Senate enacted another 
security bill authorizing medical staff to 
report patients who are illegal immigrants 
to Italian immigration officials. These new 
policies deprive undocumented immigrants 
of basic human rights including freedom 
from persecution and access to health care.
In addition to new legislation, Italy’s 
much criticized “push-back” policy cracks 
down on the arrival of undocumented indi-
viduals by sea. In 2008, an estimated 
36,000 migrants entered Italy by sea via 
Lampedusa, an island off the coast of 
Sicily. The majority comes from Africa 
to escape persecution and violence. A 
2008 agreement between Italy and Libya 
increased patrols of international waters 
to interdict migrants en route to Europe. 
Migrants on the interdicted boats have 
been either forced onto Libyan vessels or 
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taken directly to Libya, where authorities 
allegedly detain and mistreat them.
Migrants on boats intercepted by Lib-
yan authorities are not screened to deter-
mine if any individuals are asylum seekers 
or refugees before being forcibly returned 
to Libya. Therefore, according to a Human 
Rights Watch report, the agreement with 
Libya is in violation of Italy’s obligation as 
a State Party to the 1951 Refugee Conven-
tion, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the United Nations 
Convention against Torture, and European 
Convention on Human Rights not to force 
the return of people to “countries where 
their lives or freedom would be threatened, 
or where they would face a risk of torture 
or inhuman and degrading treatment.” 
Migrants that manage to escape Libyan 
vessels are often subsequently interdicted 
by Italian officials and held in overcrowded 
detention centers on Lampedusa. The con-
ditions are so poor that more than half 
of the detainees are forced to sleep out-
side under plastic sheeting. Although the 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) provides assistance 
to the migrants on the island under a proj-
ect funded by the Italian Ministry of the 
Interior and the European Commission, 
overcrowding in these temporary deten-
tion centers has become a humanitarian 
concern.
The Italian government justifies these 
draconian measures as a national security 
issue. Critics, however, attribute these laws 
to the country’s failure to better facilitate 
the integration of immigrants into Italian 
society. The European Union is also at fault 
for failing to implement a common immi-
gration approach throughout the EU so that 
individual countries would be barred from 
adopting extreme immigration policies. 
According to many human rights activists, 
the EU needs to become more involved 
in protecting immigrants and supporting 
policies for greater integration of new 
immigrants.
kaZakHstan: Human rigHts defender 
faces unfair trial
In 2010, Kazakhstan will chair the 
Organization for Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (OSCE), despite its worri-
some human rights record. Among recent 
offenses are abuses of due process in the 
criminal justice system. On September 
3, 2009, a Kazakh court found Evgeniy 
Zhovtis guilty of manslaughter and sen-
tenced him to four years in prison for 
causing a car accident that killed a young 
man. The sentence was upheld on appeal. 
Zhovtis is the director of the Kazakhstan 
Bureau on Human Rights and Rule of 
Law and a leading human rights advocate 
in Kazakhstan. He is a spokesperson for 
various human rights issues in the country 
including freedom of religion, freedom of 
assembly, and electoral reform.
International observers at Zhovtis’s two-
day court hearing included individuals 
from the OSCE, the Norwegian Helsinki 
Committee, Human Rights Watch, along 
with leaders of Kazakhstan’s opposition 
parties.
Zhovtis’s lawyer, Vitaliy Voronov, argued 
on appeal that his client was deprived of 
the due process right to a fair trial and an 
opportunity to properly present a defense. 
The trial was marked by violations of the 
Kazakh rules of criminal procedure. First, 
under Kazakh law, anyone suspected of 
a crime must be informed immediately. 
Zhovtis was informed after 17 days, giving 
his lawyers little time to prepare his case. 
Second, the trial judge either rejected or 
postponed all defense petitions without rul-
ing on them. For example, the court denied 
the defense’s motions to introduce expert 
technical evidence refuting the prosecu-
tion’s incomplete motor-vehicle examina-
tion, introduce three experts on road traffic 
accidents, and exclude the prosecution’s 
report, which used outdated forensic meth-
ods. Lastly, the court did not grant enough 
time for the defense to prepare a final 
statement before pronouncing the verdict. 
Specifically, the defense requested a few 
days to prepare a final statement, but the 
judge only granted forty minutes. The 
defense was also barred from admitting the 
victim’s mother’s statement of forgiveness 
that renounced all criminal charges against 
Zhovtis. These actions resulted in a blatant 
denial of Zhovtis’s opportunity to chal-
lenge the evidence brought against him.
In a statement made following the ver-
dict, Zhovtis alluded to the possibility that 
political motives may have contributed to 
the denial of a fair hearing. “There is no 
law here,” he stated. “[T]here is no justice 
here. Where there is no law and no justice, 
unfortunately there is a political setup.” 
In addition to political machinations, his 
defense counsel charged that the judge’s 
final verdict was prepared in advance, as 
he could not have drafted a five-page judg-
ment within thirty minutes of deliberation.
Although the Almaty Province Court 
is the final court of appeal, Kazakh leg-
islation allows for a supervisory hearing 
to address possible procedural violations. 
In light of Kazakhstan’s violations of the 
International Covenant of Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, the Declaration on Human 
Rights Defenders, and other international 
human rights instruments, Human Rights 
Watch has urged Kazakh authorities to re-
open the investigation and provide Zhovtis 
a fair and impartial trial. OSCE members 
should put pressure on Kazakhstan to 
improve its human rights record as 2010 
approaches.
south and Central asia
landmark decision in india 
decriminaliZing sex Between  
same-sex partners
The High Court of Delhi handed down 
a landmark decision on July 2, 2009, ignit-
ing fierce debate throughout India. The 
opinion in Naz Foundation v. Government 
of NCT Delhi declared that Section 377 
of the Indian Penal Code, criminalizing 
private sexual acts between consenting, 
same-sex adults violated the Indian Con-
stitution. After a decade-long campaign, 
the Naz Foundation (India) Trust (Naz 
India) brought a public interest suit against 
local and national government authori-
ties, claiming that Section 377 violated 
Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Indian 
Constitution. Named defendants included 
the National Ministry of Health and Fam-
ily Welfare.
In response, the Indian government set 
up a group of ministers to decide the mer-
its of Naz India’s challenge. The Union 
Cabinet and the Ministers chose to let the 
Supreme Court handle the matter, but sent 
Attorney General Goolam Essaji Vahanvati 
to assist in the formulation of an opinion. 
In a move which gave hope to advocates 
of the decision, the Indian government 
chose not to challenge the decision in the 
Supreme Court.
Many argue that decriminalization of 
same-sex partnerships will tear away at the 
social fabric of India and its deeply reli-
gious culture. NGOs and private citizens 
oppose the ruling, including Swami Ram-
dev, a spiritual teacher, and the Delhi Com-
mission for Protection of Child Rights. 
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The Indian Supreme Court faces enormous 
pressure from religious groups, including 
Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, and Christian orga-
nizations, many of whom find themselves 
on the same side of an issue for the first 
time. The foremost university for Islamic 
education in India, Darul Uloom Deo-
band, strongly opposes the ruling, as does 
the government’s main opposition party, 
the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata 
Party. The Indian Supreme Court also faces 
international pressure to uphold the High 
Court’s ruling. The United Nations Joint 
Programme on HIV/AIDS heralded the 
High Court decision as a noteworthy step 
in the fight against HIV and AIDS.
Neither the Indian Supreme Court nor 
the government agencies involved have 
specified when final challenges will be 
heard or when the final decision will be 
handed down. Regardless of the outcome, 
it is unlikely the Indian government will 
dispute the decision.
According to the International Gay and 
Lesbian Association’s 2009 Survey of State 
Sponsored Homophobia, eighty countries 
still criminalize sex between consenting 
adults of the same sex. Twenty-two of 
those eighty countries are in Asia and 
the Middle East. In seven of them, same-
sex intercourse is punishable by death. In 
many countries, “being gay” is considered 
a Western lifestyle that would be unheard 
of without European and American influ-
ence. If the Indian Supreme Court stands 
by the Delhi High Court’s opinion, it will 
serve as an example among of the poten-
tial to accept same-sex partnerships while 
maintaining traditional values and cultural 
identity.
prisoner releases in turkmenistan: 
sign of cHange or singular reform?
On September 29, 2009, President Gur-
banguly Berdymukhamedov of Turkmeni-
stan released 1,670 prisoners, including 
21 foreigners. This followed the release of 
9,000 prisoners in October 2008 and 2,000 
earlier this year. Those released include 
political prisoners detained during the over 
two-decade-long autocratic rule of for-
mer President Saparmurat Niyazov. Since 
his election in February 2007, Berdy-
mukhamedov has sought to encourage 
foreign investment by softening the coun-
try’s image. The recent freeing of political 
and other undisclosed prisoners signals a 
change in policy and increased openness 
in Turkmenistan since Niyazov’s death in 
2006.
Thus far, Berdymukhamedov’s new 
strategy has succeeded in generating inter-
est in investment in the country, creating 
an opportunity to influence reforms. Mul-
tinational companies interested in hydro-
carbon fuel sources have frequently visited, 
and both the United States and European 
nations have shown interest in Turkmeni-
stan’s rich natural-gas reserves. In July 
2009, the European Union approved a trade 
agreement with Turkmenistan. Although 
initially delayed in the European Parlia-
ment because of human rights concerns, 
the agreement was finally passed with the 
hope of pushing Turkmenistan to change 
its policies. Despite such efforts, Berdy-
mukhamedov has failed to democratize 
Turkmenistan, continuing to deny freedom 
of expression, intimidate journalists, and 
commit other abuses similar to those of his 
predecessor’s administration.
Fifteen NGOs issued “A Call for Access 
to Turkmenistan” on September 29, 2009, 
requesting that the strengthening of diplo-
matic and business relationships be accom-
panied by a push for human rights. The 
statement encouraged businesses, coun-
tries, and international organizations to use 
their newly-founded contacts with Turk-
menistan to push for access to the country 
and information therein.
Although Berdymukhamedov has 
moved to get rid of some of Niyazov’s most 
appalling policies, remnants of Niyazov’s 
autocracy are still visible in Turkmeni-
stan: state-controlled media; policies forc-
ing foreign journalists to work in secret; 
and restrictions on fundamental freedoms. 
Despite the number of prisoners who have 
been released, many are still detained. Reli-
able estimates of the numbers of political 
prisoners are unavailable because of a 
lack of access. The reports available from 
Turkmen prisons allege torture, sentencing 
without fair trial, and appalling condi-
tions. Human rights organizations have 
continually been denied access to exam-
ine possible human rights violations since 
Berdymukhamedov took power. Another 
issue is the black-lists used to stop Turk-
men citizens from leaving the country. In 
early October 2009, the government denied 
students permission to study at the Ameri-
can University in Bulgaria. Previously, 
these same students were also stopped 
from studying at the American University 
of Central Asia in Kyrgyzstan and only 
found out they were “black-listed” when a 
border guard informed them. According to 
Human Rights Watch, hundreds of students 
have been prevented from studying abroad 
since July 2009.
Turkmenistan is a State Party to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, guaranteeing freedom of move-
ment, and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 
guaranteeing the rights to education and 
access to higher education. The build-
ing blocks of reform are in place, and 
the opening of Turkmenistan presents an 
opportunity to push for reform. It remains 
to be seen whether the opportunity will be 
wasted in the race for natural gas reserves, 
or whether the release of these prisoners 
will signal the beginning of human rights 
reform.
Bagram prison reform: cHampioning 
rigHts or military maneuvers? 
Although it does not share the same 
notorious reputation as the military 
prison at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 
the Bagram Theater Internment Facility 
in Afghanistan has come under increasing 
scrutiny. Since September 2006, twenty 
detainees have been moved from Guanta-
namo to Bagram, which has become well 
known for sleep deprivation and water-
boarding. A prison-wide protest has been 
taking place since July 1, 2009 in objection 
to a lack of rights, including denial of legal 
counsel and information regarding the rea-
sons for their imprisonment.
Pressure on the U.S. government about 
the Bagram facility began in April 2009, 
when U.S. District Judge John D. Bates 
held in Al Maqaleh v. Gates that Bagram 
detainees had equivalent legal rights to 
those detained in Guantanamo. The deci-
sion gave three Bagram detainees the right 
to seek review of habeas corpus petitions 
for release. Amnesty International reports 
that the Obama Administration filed a brief 
in September in the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court of Appeals in the Al Maqaleh 
case, arguing that Bagram detainees should 
be denied the right to challenge their deten-
tion and attaching new “Detainee Review 
Procedures at Bagram Theater Internment 
Facility” set to go into effect in September 
2009.
These rules provide for the review of 
the detention of over six hundred prisoners 
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in the Bagram facility suspected of Al-
Qaeda and Taliban involvement and will 
closely resemble the Guantanamo Admin-
istrative Review Board process. U.S. 
military officials will represent detainees 
before military review boards during which 
detainees may call witnesses and present 
evidence. The review boards will decide if 
the detainee will remain in U.S. custody, 
be transferred to Afghan custody, or be 
released.
U.S. officials claim this process is a 
marked improvement over Guantanamo’s. 
Because most of the detainees are Afghani 
and most of the crimes took place in 
Afghanistan, witnesses and evidence are 
easier to procure. However, a major issue 
with the system is that detainees will not be 
protected by attorney-client confidentiality. 
Despite its faults, the review board will be 
the first opportunity for Bagram detainees 
to officially challenge their imprisonment. 
As of October 2009, U.S. military officers 
and officials had already been assigned to 
review boards and to individual detainees. 
Officials also plan to let isolated detainees 
see relatives and to begin releasing those 
detained without charge. In November, a 
new facility will replace the dilapidated 
Bagram prison, hopefully providing more 
humane conditions.
These steps, however, are not motivated 
solely by humanitarian concerns. Rather, 
they come after a strategic assessment of 
the war ordered by General Stanley A. 
McChrystal, which concluded that prison 
facilities in Afghanistan created “breeding 
grounds” for Al-Qaeda recruits by mixing 
militants with small-time criminals. Addi-
tionally, in mid-October, Taliban leaders 
showed a willingness to negotiate with 
the U.S. government, offering a possible 
severing of ties with Al Qaeda. One of the 
items up for negotiation is a program for 
the release of Bagram prisoners. In return, 
Taliban leaders made an ambiguous offer 
to ensure Afghanistan would not be used to 
attack the United States.
However, since the CIA will lose long-
term detention facilities with the closure 
of Guantanamo, many U.S. officials are 
fighting to keep Bagram open. The United 
States has ratified the International Con-
vention on Civil and Political Rights, 
which bans detention without cause and 
the denial of due process, and it is also a 
signatory of the Third Geneva Convention, 
which addresses the treatment of prisoners 
of war. The United States has been accused 
of violating both of these international con-
ventions at Guantanamo and risks the same 
accusations at Bagram.
east asia
laBor issues at tHe kaesǒng 
industrial complex in nortH korea
Located just across the demilitarized 
zone in North Korea, the Kaesǒng Indus-
trial Complex (KIC) is an industrial area 
where South Korean companies use North 
and South Korean labor to manufacture 
products. A joint project formed in 2004 
between North and South Korea, the 
KIC is a symbol of the growing level of 
engagement in North-South relations. As 
of June 2009, about forty thousand North 
Koreans and one thousand South Kore-
ans were employed in the KIC, produc-
ing watches, shoes, clothes, kitchenware, 
plastic containers, electrical cords, and car 
parts. Recently, however, concerns have 
been raised about working conditions and 
exploitation at the KIC.
Officially, the minimum monthly wage 
for North Korean workers at the KIC is 
U.S. $52.50. However, North Korean gov-
ernment authorities retain the majority of 
worker salaries, and only a small amount 
reaches employees’ pockets. Article 32 of 
the KIC Labor Law requires that South 
Korean companies disburse wages directly 
to workers in cash. In practice, these funds 
are paid to a government agency in U.S. 
dollars at the request of the North Korean 
government, which maintains that this pol-
icy is due to insufficient foreign exchange 
centers in the KIC. Human Rights Watch 
suggests that as much as thirty percent 
of wages owed to workers at the KIC 
are retained as contributions to a fund 
to provide free housing, healthcare, and 
education to the North Korean public. 
Others go further to argue that the work-
ers in the KIC receive only about U.S. $2 
per month, which means the North Korean 
government absorbs about 96.7 percent of 
the wages. Although the KIC Labor Law 
guarantees employees full compensation 
for their labor, the exact amount workers 
receive remains unclear.
In addition, other fundamental workers’ 
rights are not covered by the KIC Labor 
Law. The North Korean Central Guidance 
Agency on Special Zone Development, a 
cabinet level administrative body, recruits 
KIC workers and selects worker represen-
tatives. By not allowing companies to bid 
for skilled workers, the North Korean gov-
ernment maintains a stable workforce and 
controls labor costs. This practice inter-
feres with the workers’ ability to elect their 
own representatives to act on their behalf. 
Moreover, it is a clear violation of workers’ 
rights to freedom of association and col-
lective bargaining, which are protected by 
international treaties to which North and 
South Korea are States Parties, including 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.
To fulfill its legal obligations to work-
ers within its borders, the North Korean 
government should work with the Inter-
national Labor Organization to re-exam-
ine and revise the KIC Labor Law. The 
law should be amended to include work-
ers’ rights to freedom of association; to 
choose their employment according to their 
wishes free from government interference; 
and to be fully informed of their rights. 
Furthermore, South Korean corporations 
should perform their duties as employers 
to respect labor standards and to enforce 
the KIC Labor Law effectively. The revised 
law should impose sanctions on employers 
in cases where violations occur. The con-
tinued success of economic collaboration 
between North and South Korea depends 
on adequate and effective legal protections 
of workers in the KIC.
imprisonment of cHina’s legal 
activists
On October 1, 2009, China celebrated 
the 60th anniversary of its Communist 
leadership. Displaying pride in their coun-
try’s development, government officials 
and citizens organized parades, firework 
displays, and events to contribute to the 
biggest celebration in Chinese history. 
However, in addition to the festivities, the 
event included efforts to silence dissenting 
voices to prevent them from raising human 
rights concerns challenging the image of 
social harmony.
Among the advocates targeted were Xu 
Zhiyong, founder of the Open Constitution 
Initiative (OCI), and Zhuang Lu, OCI’s 
financial manager. Known as Gongmeng 
in Chinese, OCI was founded in 2002 
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to provide representation for victims in 
cases that are unwelcomed by the Chinese 
government. The lawyers at OCI are at the 
forefront of providing free legal services to 
disadvantaged groups in China, including 
victims of torture and parents of children 
who died or fell ill after drinking tainted 
milk.
On July 14, 2009, OCI received noti-
fication from the national and Beijing tax 
bureaus of a fine for ¥1.42 million (U.S. 
$208,000). Shortly thereafter, Xu Zhiyong 
and Zhuang Lu were seized on suspicion of 
tax evasion. Beijing Civil Affairs Bureau 
officials confiscated files, computers, and 
other equipment from OCI’s office and 
ordered the center shut down.
Officially, Xu Zhiyong was charged 
with tax evasion. The Chinese government 
claimed OCI was shut down because it was 
operating as a business and had not regis-
tered as a non-profit as required by law. 
However, civil rights activists and human 
rights organizations allege that it was part 
of a larger effort to stifle dissent in the 
countdown to the celebration by targeting 
civil rights advocates. This discrepancy in 
registration is likely due to highly restric-
tive government regulations. Xu Zhiyong 
claimed that although OCI had not reg-
istered as an NGO, it “has always been 
a non-profit organization” and that OCI 
made “no profits whatsoever, but . . . 
got penalties for income tax.” Since only 
organizations with government approval 
prior to their formation can register as non-
profits, many take the same route as OCI, 
registering initially as commercial entities 
and later trying to register as NGOs. Thus, 
the forcible shutdown of OCI has alarmed 
China’s non-profit community.
The arrests of Xu Zhiyong and Zhuang 
Lu illustrate only a fraction of what civil 
rights activists experience in China. Law-
yers who take politically sensitive cases 
face possible arrest, kidnapping, and phys-
ical attacks. Amnesty International, which 
continues to receive reports of intimida-
tion of activists in Beijing, estimates that 
several hundred dissidents are under vari-
ous kinds of surveillance or house arrest 
throughout China.
Zhuang Lu and Xu Zhiyong were 
released on August 22 and 23, respectively, 
perhaps largely due to public advocacy in 
China and Hong Kong. Although this may 
demonstrate increasing responsiveness to 
domestic activism, NGOs in China con-
tinue to face government restrictions and 
interference.
In a statement on his blog, Xu Zhiy-
oung describes OCI’s closure as a “pen-
alty to the baby victims of the poisonous 
milk powders; a penalty to the young 
students at migrant workers’ childrens’ 
schools . . . [and] a penalty to tens of thou-
sands of the poor and powerless, those who 
need the society’s help the most.” By sanc-
tioning lawyers for their efforts to remedy 
social tensions, the Chinese government is 
preventing its citizens from seeking legal 
redress for their grievances, leaving inno-
cent individuals with no remedy for their 
injuries.
criminal procedures in Japan: tHe 
need for reform
After serving 17 years in prison, Toshi-
kazu Sugaya was released in June this year 
when DNA testing failed to connect him 
with the crime. Sugaya was sentenced to 
life in prison in 1993 for murdering a four-
year-old girl after confessing to the crime 
during a police interrogation. He later 
retracted his confession, arguing it was 
obtained through duress. At his retrial that 
began on October 21, 2009, Sugaya pled 
not guilty and asked the court to justify his 
treatment.
Sugaya’s wrongful conviction sparked 
calls for reform of Japan’s criminal justice 
system, which has long been the subject of 
criticism by international community for 
lack of mechanisms to protect defendants’ 
rights. In Japan, suspects are detained in 
daiyo kangoku — holding cells in police 
stations — for as long as 23 days without 
charges. Suspects are questioned without 
legal representation and without a time 
limit on interrogation sessions.
The conviction rate in Japan is over 99 
percent, partially due to the large number 
of confessions obtained at daiyo kangoku. 
Relying on confessions as the basis of 
conviction encourages the use of force 
or threat during interrogations. Amnesty 
International contends that coercion, 
assault, and other inhumane treatment, 
including keeping suspects awake for days, 
are used in daiyo kangoku. Thus, many 
suspects confess to crimes they did not 
commit to protect themselves from further 
abuse.
The United Nations Committee against 
Torture was established under the Con-
vention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, to which Japan acceded in 1999. 
In 2007, the 38th session of the Com-
mittee examined Japan’s criminal justice 
system, and specifically addressed the use 
of torture in daiyo kangoku, stating that the 
lack of procedural guarantees for detainees 
“may lead to a de facto failure to respect 
the principles of presumption of innocence, 
right to silence and right of defense.” 
The Committee recommended that Japan 
implement measures to guarantee that all 
detainees have legal representation and 
that independent monitoring of police con-
duct is carried out. The Committee also 
expressed concern with Japan’s high con-
viction rate and called for systematic moni-
toring and recording of interrogations.
However, Japan responded that the pres-
ence of defense counsel during interro-
gations would hinder investigations and 
inhibit effective questioning. Japanese 
police and public prosecutors also argue 
that recording interrogation sessions will 
decrease the level of trust between suspects 
and investigators, impeding the efficiency 
of the questioning process.
In Japan’s August 2009 general election, 
the Democratic Party of Japan overwhelm-
ingly defeated the Liberal Democratic 
Party, which had governed for 54 years, 
and promised to adopt monitoring mecha-
nisms for interrogations at daiyo kangoku. 
With due consideration of human rights, 
the new Japanese government should keep 
its pledge to guarantee suspects’ rights and 
avoid wrongful convictions. Only through 
judicial procedures conforming to interna-
tional standards can the Japanese criminal 
system fulfill its function to deter and pun-
ish perpetrators and to effectively protect 
Japanese society and its citizens.
southeast asia and oCeania
tHai government to forciBly 
repatriate lao Hmong refugees
The government of Thailand announced 
that it will forcibly repatriate all remaining 
Lao Hmong refugees from Thailand by the 
end of 2009. These repatriations are pursu-
ant to a joint Lao-Thai Committee on Bor-
der Security agreement requiring Thailand 
to return all Hmong to Laos. Currently, 
approximately 4,000 refugees still live in 
the military-controlled Huai Nam Khao 
camp. While the Thai government claims 
that most repatriations are voluntary, they 
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come without independent observation and 
are often the result of extreme coercion by 
the military.
Conditions in the Huai Nam Khao camp 
are stark, and the Thai government severely 
limits access by outsiders. Médecins Sans 
Frontièrs (MSF) was the only organization 
allowed inside the camp, but according 
to MSF, “restrictions and coercive tactics 
imposed by the Thai military authorities” 
forced the organization to cease operations. 
Despite repeated requests, the Thai govern-
ment has refused access to the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees.
The Huai Nam Khao camp is crowded 
and unsanitary. There is a high risk of diar-
rhea and cholera epidemics and, according 
to MSF, a “high level of psychological 
distress” among refugees. These mental 
health issues are caused in part by a fear of 
returning to Laos. Many Hmong, who were 
trained by and fought with the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency during the Vietnam 
War, are now targeted and persecuted by 
the communist Lao government. In the 
past, refugees in the Huai Nam Khao camp 
have resorted to arson, hunger strikes, and 
suicide attempts in an effort to stop their 
repatriation and garner attention from the 
outside world.
Thai officials claim that the Lao Hmong 
are economic migrants and not refugees 
protected by international law. These claims 
are contradicted, however, by reports that 
Lao government officials indefinitely 
detain and abuse some repatriated Hmong. 
To avoid capture, many Hmong live in the 
jungle in Laos, hiding from the govern-
ment and the military. One young Hmong 
refugee in Thailand described her experi-
ence to MSF: “Laotian soldiers attack 
us regularly, at least four or five times a 
year . . . . Generally, the soldiers systemati-
cally kill the men and capture the women.”
In recent months the Lao military has 
stepped up its assault on Hmong, report-
edly with support from the Vietnamese 
People’s Army. The Lao military has even 
employed Hmong to hunt down their own 
people. Several reports have circulated 
describing heavy artillery attacks, includ-
ing the use of mortars and machine guns, 
on Hmong hiding in the highlands of Laos.
Thailand’s treatment of refugees vio-
lates norms of international humanitarian 
law. Thailand is not a signatory to the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees and has no domestic refugee law 
or provisions for asylum. Even though the 
Thai government is not violating domestic 
law in repatriating these refugees, forcing 
refugees to return to their country of origin 
violates the customary international law 
principle of non-refoulement. Non-refoule-
ment protects people from being forcibly 
returned to a country where their lives or 
freedom would be threatened.
Many international humanitarian orga-
nizations, governments, and the UN have 
called for Thailand to improve its treatment 
of refugees and to stop the planned repa-
triation. Eric Schwartz, Assistant Secretary 
for the Bureau of Population, Refugees 
and Migration at the U.S. State Depart-
ment, told the Human Rights Brief that 
it is the State Department’s position that 
“anyone returned [to Laos] has to have had 
the opportunity to have their claims heard 
in a fair and transparent manner.” Despite 
this foreign pressure, the Thai govern-
ment insists on going forward with the 
repatriations.
tongan parliament reJects cedaw 
ratification, women’s groups react
On September 18, 2009, the Tongan 
Parliament announced that it will not ratify 
the UN Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW). The Parliament rea-
soned that certain provisions of CEDAW 
go against Tongan social and cultural tra-
dition, and that women are “cherished 
and respected” in Tonga without the Con-
vention. Tongan officials also expressed 
an unwillingness to change national laws 
regarding land and inheritance rights, abor-
tion, and family planning, which would be 
mandated if the country adopted CEDAW. 
In his speech to the UN General Assembly 
on September 26, Dr. Feleti Sevele, Tonga’s 
Prime Minister, emphasized that “Tonga 
would rather be judged on its actions of 
empowerment of women in Tongan society 
over the past century than by a ratification 
of convenience.” Currently, 185 states are 
party to the Convention, representing over 
90 percent of UN Member States. States 
not party to CEDAW include Iran, Soma-
lia, and Sudan.
The widest gap between existing Ton-
gan law and the provisions of CEDAW 
relates to land and inheritance. CEDAW 
mandates that women have the same rights 
as men to ownership of property and 
choice of residence. In Tonga, however, 
women can lease but cannot own land. 
Inheritance passes through male heirs, and 
a son born out of wedlock takes precedence 
over a widow or legitimate daughter in the 
distribution of a man’s estate. A widow 
may continue to live on her husband’s 
land if there are no male heirs, so long as 
she does not remarry or have any sexual 
relationships.
Women’s groups in Tonga are react-
ing strongly to Parliament’s decision. In 
response to the government’s claim that 
women are “cherished,” ‘Ofakilevuka Gut-
tenbeil, Managing Director of the Tongan 
National Centre for Women and Children 
(TNCWC), asked, “If this statement was 
true why on earth are we seeing bat-
tered women on a daily basis . . . why on 
earth have we had four homicides out of 
six homicides in the first six months of 
this year [concerning] husbands murder-
ing their wives?” The TNCWC claims that 
over two hundred women each year seek 
help for domestic violence, while much 
more goes unreported. This number is sig-
nificant given Tonga’s relatively small pop-
ulation of approximately 50,220 women.
While the Parliament has declared its 
intention to deal with women’s issues on 
its own, many Tongan women’s groups 
are still pressing for Tonga to align itself 
with international standards by ratifying 
CEDAW. A coalition of five women’s orga-
nizations is circulating a petition that they 
will present to top government officials 
in hopes of overturning the Parliament’s 
decision. Some women activists have even 
declared their intention to fast until Prime 
Minister Sevele is removed from office.
toward a regional understanding: 
cHallenges for asean’s 
intergovernmental commission on 
Human rigHts 
Members of the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN) officially 
launched the new ASEAN Intergovern-
mental Commission on Human Rights 
(AICHR) on October 23, 2009. The AICHR 
is a consultative body, comprised of one 
government-appointed representative from 
each of the ten ASEAN Member States. 
Unlike other regional human rights bodies, 
AICHR currently performs no investigative 
or judicial functions. Although this body 
has already faced considerable criticism, 
little attention has been paid to the ways in 
which the AICHR could be effective in the 
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short term, including the kind of progress 
that would be practical at this point.
Article 4.2 of the Terms of Reference, 
the official governing document of the 
AICHR, lists as one of its mandates and 
primary functions “[t]o develop an ASEAN 
Human Rights Declaration with a view to 
establishing a framework for human rights 
cooperation . . . .” Before the AICHR can 
develop a substantive framework, however, 
ASEAN Member States must first agree on 
what “human rights” are, what standards 
they will use to measure progress, and 
what, if any, the consequences would be for 
non-compliance.
Currently, there is a significant split 
among ASEAN Member States in their 
recognition of international human rights 
norms as expressed through the ratifica-
tion of international conventions and trea-
ties. Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, 
Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia have signed 
and ratified almost all major international 
human rights conventions. By contrast, 
Malaysia, Burma, Singapore, and Brunei 
have each ratified only the Convention for 
the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC).
Given this sharp divide, a realistic start-
ing point for the AICHR in drafting a 
Human Rights Declaration might be rights 
similar to those expressed in CEDAW 
and CRC, since every ASEAN Member 
State has generally accepted the principles 
embodied in these conventions. Agreement 
on issues such as gender equality and the 
rights of children may help to create a 
foundation for a broader Human Rights 
Declaration. Moreover, the process of dis-
cussing and drafting an agreement on these 
issues may facilitate improved cooperation 
among Member States, easing the transi-
tion to debating more contentious issues.
Achieving the stated purposes of 
AICHR, including the promotion and pro-
tection of human rights in the region, will 
inevitably be slow. The region’s history of 
human rights abuses and firm commitment 
to national sovereignty create significant 
hurdles that must first be cleared. At least 
some ASEAN Member States, neverthe-
less, seem open to genuine dialogue and 
compromise. The Philippines, for example, 
has been pushing for the creation of the 
AICHR for several years. Additionally, 
Indonesia appointed as its representative 
Rafendi Djamin, a veteran human rights 
activist.
Despite early criticism, many human 
rights advocates in the region are reserving 
judgment until they see what the AICHR 
can accomplish. Anna Samson, National 
Legal, Communications, and Advocacy 
Officer for the Jesuit Refugee Service in 
Thailand, told the Human Rights Brief 
that the formation of the AICHR is a “step 
forward as it creates an avenue for dialogue 
in the region.” Even so, Samson and other 
members of civil society throughout the 
region are cautiously waiting to see how 
the AICHR can “operationalize human 
rights” in Southeast Asia.  HRB
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